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The economic theory of the firm has met an exponential growth in the last decades different from the 
traditional neoclassical approach. In the first part of the paper we are skimming through the most spread 
approaches, namely the theory of incomplete contracts and evolutionary school. In the second part we 
apply the explications on integration provided by the economics of transaction costs with an example on 
the oil industry in Romania. A brief qualitative analysis reaches out the conclusion that cutting transaction 
and agency costs is one of the factors that leads to integration within the studied sector.  
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Introduction 
The fast organizational and technological changes of the last years, globalization and the more noticeable 
restrictive character of resources have lead to the reconsideration of the economic theories of the firm and 
development of new approaches. But what are the reasons that lay beyond the existence of the firm? How 
much can it develop? These are opened questions to which microeconomics provides a large offer of 
answers, in the form of a system of new theories or just interdependent hypotheses.   
The movement of the borders of the firm in the global economy due to mergers and acquisitions carried on 
at global, regional or just local level leads to the increase of the degree of horizontal or vertical integration. 
As an example, in the region of Central and Eastern Europe in 2007 mergers and acquisitions summed 
192.6 billion dollars of which 4.4 % carried on in Romania increasing by 83.8% compared to 2006. By 
these processes similar or different interdependent activities are placed under the roof of the same firm. 
Studying the causes of integration can’t be separated from the analysis of the nature of the firm even 
though in this paper our goal is to explain the limits of the development of firms. The causes of integration 
as economic theory presents them can be grouped in a few categories and these are: acquiring or increasing 
market power and monopoly profit, protection against competition, cutting transaction costs and agency 
costs, correction of market imperfections, skipping some regulations, increasing the degree of security in 
supplying production factors. 
By the present paper we don’t realize an exhaustive presentation of the nature and limits of the firm but the 
most important features within the theory of incomplete contracts that includes transaction cost economics, 
theory of property rights and agency theory. Yet while exposing the economic literature in this area we’ll 
refer  to  other  approaches,  too  for  a  clearer  delimitation  of  the  topic  against  contemporary  theoretical 
background.   113 
Theoretical Background 
It was in 1926 when Pietro Sraffa in his article “The laws of returns under competitive conditions” that 
questions the model of perfect competition. But the paper to be the cornerstone of what today we call 
economic theory of the firm is “The nature of the firm” published in 1937 by Ronald Coase, in which the 
author asks himself why the firm exists if according to the model of general equilibrium shows that the 
market allocates efficiently the resources. Coase argues that using the mechanisms of prices is not for free 
in a world dominated by uncertainty and information asymmetry. The Nobel winner calls transaction costs 
“the costs of carrying out a transaction by means of an exchange on the open market or simply marketing 
costs”
18. The transaction is seen both as a transfer of rights of use on goods and services between separable 
technological units (Menard, 2000) and a potential source of conflict that assumes a transfer of social rights 
within a certain institutional framework (Commons, 1934). Transaction costs mainly include negotiation 
and contracting costs, the reduction of the number of contracts inclusive, costs corresponding to potential 
conflicts  and  costs  as  a  result  of  the  authorities  differentiate  approach  of  transactions.  In  his  paper 
published in 1988, Coase suggests that studying and understanding the structure of an industry implies 
explaining from the perspective of transaction costs the relations between the firm with the lowest cost and 
the  market,  relations  between  firms  and  the  interdependencies  between  different  activities  carried  out 
within the same firm. The limit of the firm “is set where its costs of organizing a transaction became equal 
to the cost of carrying it out through the market”
19. 
Transaction costs economics, research-orientated by Coase’s papers, is developed and consolidated by the 
reference papers of Oliver Williamson. The latter defines three features of the transaction, considered the 
cornerstone of the analysis in microeconomics, interdependent and these are: frequency, uncertainty and 
asset specificity against the background of two behavioral hypotheses limited rationality (according to H. 
Simon)  and  opportunistic  behavior.  Between  the  frequency  of  transactions  and  the  probability  of 
integration there is a direct correlation since there are many opportunities for the moral hazard to appear 
and therefore much more potential losses to compensate the internalization cost of that transaction. To 
support this statement there are a few empirical proofs (Majumadar and Ramaswamy, 1994) or a few 
studies  that  have  shaken  it  (Anderson  and  Schmittlein,  1984).  Uncertainty,  direct  correlated  to  the 
probability  of  integration  (empirical  proofs  are  provided  by  Lieberman,  1991  and  Majumadar  and 
Ramaswamy,  1994)  has  2  shapes:  an  environmental  uncertainty,  a  pre-requisite  of  the  business 
environment  and  behavioral  uncertainty,  the  most  important,  a  result  of  bilateral  dependence  and 
information asymmetry. Asset specificity is the main characteristic of a transaction. Williamson shows 
that: “asset specificity has reference to the degree to which an asset can be redeployed to alternative uses 
and by alternative users without sacrifice of productive value”
20. Asset specificity is important against the 
background of behavioral hypotheses mentioned above since the take the form of sunk costs in case of 
contract breaking. After the parties of a contract, incomplete by its nature, sign the contract that has as 
object a specific asset takes place what Williamson calls “fundamental transformation”: if initially the 
parties have chosen the partner from a competitive market, after signing the contract their relation turns 
into a bilateral one. The continuation of the relation between the parties whose identity is now important 
produces quasi-rents established as a differential of the capitalized value of the asset controlled together 
and  the  sum  of  the  values  of  the  asset  controlled  separately  by  the  two  parties
21.  Depending  on  the 
characteristics of the transaction, three governance structures may appear: market, hierarchy and hybrids 
(such as franchising). Governance structures are supported by different forms of contract law. The market 
is based on the classical contract law in which the identity of the parties doesn’t matter, the continuation of 
the contract doesn’t add value and the contract complies with strict rules, well defined, possible disputes 
being solved by the Law Court. The hybrid has as cornerstone the neoclassical contract law and excuse 
                                                            
18 Coase R. H., The Firm, the Market and the Law, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 
1988, pp. 6 
19 Ibid., pp.7 
20 Williamson, Oliver, The Mechanisms of Governance, Oxford University Press, 1996, p. 59 
21  Holmstrom, Bengt, Roberts, John, The Boundaries of the Firm, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 
vol.12, no.4, 1998, p. 75 
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doctrine, in which the parties maintain their independence and to a certain extent depend one on each other. 
The contract is a flexible framework that allows post-adjustment and disputes are solved by arbitrage. The 
hierarchy is characterized by forbearance, more precisely by an internal juridical contract that stipulates 
that  any  post-adjustment  will  be  made  by  hierarchical  relations.  There  are  other  three  elements  that 
differentiate  governance  structures:  the  intensity  of  incentive  tools,  administrative  controlling  and 
adaptation to the unpredictable. The market is characterized by the highest incentive, no administrative 
controlling and an autonomous adaptation through price mechanism (walrasian model). If unpredictable 
changes appear, the negotiation may be expensive and the adaptation may fail (the transaction stops). The 
hierarchy is a structure within which the intensity of incentive is lower than in the case of the market, 
administrative  controlling  higher  and  the  adaptation  is  a  coordinated  one:  the  individuals  accept  the 
decision of the superiors and cooperation since they consider it’s in their interest. This way are saved 
resources otherwise wasted by negotiation and solving disputes, possible sunk costs (if the adaptation fails) 
but  with  the  price  of  a  diminishing  incentive  and  bureaucracy  costs.  Within  the  hybrid  keeping  the 
autonomy of the parties leads to higher incentives than in hierarchy but bilateral dependence and non-
neglectable asset specificity assumes accepting some protective measures that lower the incentive towards 
market  and  increase  administrative  controlling  and  coordinated  adaptation.  It  results  that  the  costs 
corresponding to governance structures are mainly influenced by asset specificity. When the specificity is 
zero the market has an advantage since there are no potential losses to compensate bureaucracy costs 
specific  to  the  hierarchy.  As  asset  specificity  raises  governance  costs  raise  faster  that  in  the  case  of 
transactions through the market than those through the firm since the importance of the adaptation for 
prolonging the contract grows exponentially (the hybrid is in between the two). For this reason there is a 
given specificity level beyond which the organization as a hierarchy has the lowest transaction costs (for 
Williamson  these  are  costs  of  the  economic  system  functioning).  The  firm  appears  as  a  governance 
structure that allows minimizing transaction costs. The statement according to which asset specificity has a 
significant  impact  on  vertical  integration  given  the  incomplete  character  of  contracts  and  the  need  of 
adaptation form the paradigm problem of Williamson.  Integration is a reply to contractual difficulties 
driven by asset specificity and explaining integration is in fact explaining why administrative coordination 
may be preferred to market coordination. Integration turns out to be a vehicle “to safeguards the gains that 
arise from exchange characterized by high physical asset specificity and human relationships”
22 (quasi-
revenue).  But  why  at  one  moment  the  expansion  of  the  firm  stops?  The  explanation  offered  by  the 
economics  of  transaction  costs  is  based  on  incentive  issues  and  bureaucracy  since  integration  drives 
distortions and specific costs. These arise especially because it’s impossible to keep within the firm the 
incentive intensity specific to the market therefore there is a permanent trade-off between bureaucracy 
costs and gains from adaptation leading to “disintegration” or “dismergers” as Coase argued. 
The analysis of transaction costs is linked to that of property rights: the existence of property rights makes 
the system of property rights to affect resource allocation and the efficiency of the allocation since like 
contracts are incomplete the same way property rights are defined incompletely. The way they are defined 
and allocated sets the diversity and characteristics of organizational structures. The firm is a nexus of 
contracts that stipulate a certain structure of property rights and “on one hand allows making use of the 
advantages  of  specialization  and  on  the  other  hand  to  provide  an  effective  incentive  and  controlling 
system”
23. The idea of a firm as a nexus of contracts between the holders of resources (production factors) 
and clients is taken over by agency theory (Meckling and Jensen, 1976) that fills in the theory of property 
rights. The firm is a legal fiction, an environment of negotiation and contracting similar to the market: there 
is no opposition between market/firm but 2 forms of the market concept: the firm and the neoclassical 
market. Therefore there is no point to try to explain the limits of the firm but the contracting relations 
between individuals (that pursue to minimize agency costs) no matter the environment where they arise. 
A completely new vision is introduced by the evolutionary school that considers as cornerstone for the 
microeconomic analysis: Homo sapiens oeconomicus (HSO). Who is he? He is “Homo sapiens as a rule-
                                                            
22 Majumadar, S.K., Ramaswamy, V., Explaining Downstream Integration, Managerial and Decision 
Economics, vol.15, no.2, 1994, p. 121 
23 Coriat, B., Weinstein, O., Les Nouvelles Theories de l’entreprise, Le livre de poche, Paris, 1995, p.85
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making and rule-using animal in economic contexts, such as production, consumption and transaction”
24. 
One should make a difference between elementary basis-unit HSO and what evolutionists call a micro-unit 
itself, in the economic theory of the firm a socially organized productive unit with a knowledge base. The 
firm is a community based on rules (Nelson, 2005) within which knowledge is created, adopted selectively, 
learnt, adjusted and used repetitively. By repeated use rules appear, also called organizational routines. 
Routines  seem  to  be  specific  assets,  non  transferable  leading  to  differences  between  enterprises  and 
different positioning on the market. The firm survives on the medium-long run due to a type of governing 
named generically governance different from governance structures mentioned above that evolutionists call 
operant  governance.  Generic  governance  takes  care  of  the  management  of  the  knowledge  base  and 
therefore organizational changes within complex social network that the firm represents. As a result the 
dynamics of the firm is established endogenously and path dependency and routines lead to a certain 
technological path of the firm that will set the limits of the latter’s activity. 
Some synthesizing statements are required in the end of this short theoretical background: the research 
concerning the limits of the firm are interdependent with those on the nature of the firm; TCE suggests a 
present  dichotomy  between  the  firm  and  the  market,  the  limits  of  the  firm  being  given  by  incentive 
constraints;  TPR  and  TA  consider  the  market  and  the  firm  are  two  market  forms  that  is  transaction 
environment and contracting nexus so there is no point to study the limits of the firm; evolutionary school 
associates the firm with a knowledge and technologies integrated system formed by learning within which 
routines and learning processes lead to a certain technological path that will set the limits of the activity of 
the firm.  
Short empirical application: the oil market in Romania 
The empirical applications of the TCE on the oil market that formed the base of the present study belong to 
O. Williamson (1996)
25, Andrea Shepard (1993), Margaret E. Slade (1996). Our goal was to answer the 
question: are transaction costs a cause of the disintegration/integration of the activities on the oil market in 
Romania? In our empirical try we made use of the information public available on the websites of the 
corporations within the industry and official studies and statistics. The opacity of the information didn’t 
allow us yet to carry out a quantitative research therefore the conclusions that we’ll expose are based on a 
qualitative research. 
In the Romanian oil sector we could identify three big operators: Petrom (holds two refineries, Arpechim 
and Petrobrazi), Rompetrol (with two refineries, Vega and Petromidia) and Lukoil (Petrotel refinery). In 
our paper we focused on the first two players whose evolutions allowed us to identify some conclusions 
with reference to the target of the research. In short, the firms that activate in the Romanian oil sector may 
be represented like this: 
[RESOURCES(oil,  gas)]=>REFINERIES=>RETAIL(own  or  autonomous)]  +  IDUSTRY  SUPPIRT 
SERVICES 
The sketch drawn above is significant for the high degree of integration specific to the area. Thus the two 
selected firms carry out or are to carry out activities of exploration and production, refining, oil production 
and petrochemical products, retail, support services such as trading petrol and oil products, construction 
and positioning, quality management and so on.  
The evolution of the Rompetrol group by chain expansion to complementary transactions underlines the 
strategy of diversification of the latter in order to increase profit and reduce bilateral dependency and an 
organizational pattern named by Porter by two categories of activities: production/distribution and support. 
The development of the group started from a firm of intermediation of oil products transactions. Step by 
step this firm bought refineries (supplying with transacted products), fuel stations (supplying/expanded 
                                                            
24 Dopfer, Kurt, Evolutionary economics: a theoretical framework, in The Evolutionary Foundations of 
Economics, Cambridge Univerity Press, 2005, p.23 
 
25 In the paperThe Mechanism of Governance published in 1996, chapter 5, the 6th part (Petroleum 
Exchanges), p. 137, O. Williamson draws a short analysis based on a sttudy with reference to the Canadian 
market, The State of Competition in the Canadian Petroleum Industry. 
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distribution both in Romania and abroad), and built new business units of transportation, maintaining, 
research, financial, quality and environment  management. All the business  units are specialized in oil 
industry,  transact  (with  a  few  exceptions)  mainly  within  the  company  (but  also  outside)  and  assume 
making use of assets specific to this industry. The integration pursued the profit but also according to us the 
specificity of physical and human assets had a key role. It is interesting to notice that specificity was two-
way orientated: on the one hand because specific assets existed new business units were created in order to 
exploit competences and on the other hand because the new activities that the firm needed assumed asset 
specificity and the possibility of hold-up their integration was preferred to the free market. Concerning the 
uncertainty we could notice the acquisition in August 2007 by KazMunaiGas of 75% of the Rompetrol 
Group the stated target of the buyer being to enter European market. Before the acquisition the Rompetrol 
Group relied exclusively on imported oil, 80% of the costs of the group were driven by the mentioned 
imports.  Starting  from  2005  the  oil  price  met  a  high  volatility  with  an  obvious  increasing  trend  that 
significantly increased the uncertainty of the environment for Rompetrol with a negative impact on the 
financial results. The integration in KMG under the umbrella of the provider was the solution to reduce 
environment uncertainty proving a positive correlation between uncertainty and integration. 
Concerning Petrom-OMV its organizational structure is similar to that of Rompetrol but the independence 
of the business units seems smaller. Integration is technology-driven but in 2002 an event revealed the 
importance of transaction costs: at that moment Petrom decided to externalize maintenance services by 
setting an independent firm called Petroserv, later Petromservice. Later this firm due to asset specificity 
had  an  opportunistic  behavior  being  reintegrated  in  2006  in  Petrom-OMV.  The  acquisition  cost  of 
Petromservice  by  Petrom-OMV,  summing  328.5  million  euro,  offers  an  image  of  the  quasi-revenue 
generated by specific assets corresponding to the transaction.  
In the relation between production and distribution the studies carried out for the fuel stations in USA and 
Canada showed the variety of contracting forms and significant differences between the ownership of the 
stations. In Romania there are two ways of organization: stations the ownership of the producers and dealer 
stations  (for  Petrom-OMV)  or  partner  (for  Rompetrol)  with  diverse  activities  (fuel  and  auto  products 
marketing, cafeteria, carwash and so on). The resulted governance structure is of hybrid with a certain 
degree of dependence supplier-retailer. More than this recently Petrom has externalized the retail activity 
appealing to dealers showing that the integration of the activity within the company was a right decision 
because of diminishing incentives. By externalization the sales of carburant raised by 23% and those of 
complementary products by 76% in 2006/2007. As a result incentive reduction by internalization is a limit 
to the development of the firm.    
Some brief conclusions are required for this market in Romania: the theory of incomplete contracts is 
useful and applicable; asset specificity is a cause of integration together with the technological factor, the 
increase  of  security  degree  in  resource  supplying,  entering  external  markets  and  increasing  profit  and 
monopoly power, the increase of uncertainty thrives integration and the statute of residual claimant for 
retailers considering a hybrid structure increases incentive without a negative influence on adaptation and 
controlling. 
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